Tuesday, May 6, 2008
Hume: Compatibilism Pt 2
The only explanation that Hume gives for compatibilism is that both free will and determinism appear to be true. He defends determinism by saying that the chain of cause and effect in nature is inevitable, and everybody acknowledges that it is there--it is part of human psychology. He defends freewill by saying that we appear to freely do things that we are capable of doing. So, as long as you're not in chains or restricted by drugs or anything else, you have freewill. My problem with that, as I've stated in earlier posts, is that you can't really know that you're making those choices and doing those things freely. We can't prove that those things aren't part of the whole grand scheme of determinism. If we could go back in time, maybe we'd have a shot at proving or disproving that, but obviously we can't. But anyway, Hume does not address how determinism and freewill might work together. He just argues for determinism, and then argues for freewill. Since he has reasonable arguments for both, he decides that both are true and they work together. So if I'm going to agree with his theory of compatibilism, I would only have to agree that both determinism and freewill are true, without acknowledging how they might work together and all that. Obviously since I'm not convinced by his argument for freewill, I'm not convinced by his version of compatibilism. It seems to me like he kind of took the easy way out of this one because he liked the idea of compatibilism but didn't have any good arguments for it.
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3 comments:
Here's an argument for compatibilism: If we define free will not by reference to alternate possibilities (the ability to do otherwise) but rather as the ability to act according to one's desires, then we may certainly be free if determinism is the case. So as long as I am not coerced or forced to do something, or prohibited from doing something, then I can have free will. This can be the case even if my desire to do something is determined. The point of compatibilism is to define free will in a less robust way. It seems obvious that we cannot be the first cause of our actions (because we are not the first cause of ourselves), but maybe thats not necessary in order to have a meaningful conception of free will. If we accept the compatibilist's definition of free will (as I gave above), then free will is in perfect harmony with determinism.
dan, you make a great point. i think people sometimes get free will confused with choice. i think both free will and determism could be true. and if we look at past actions it can be seen that all past actions have been determined, but i still think at present we have free will. if all things are changing, and the way things change is changing, then we are always at the edge of time and the change. i think because of this not everything can be determined at present
If our present actions are only to become past ones, then aren't they to be determined as well and not chosen by free will?
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