Kant- The third antinomy of pure reason

As for the second two antinomies, Kant says that the dialectically opposed propositions of each contradict one another only if one takes appearances (phenomena) to be things in themselves(noumena). The thesis of the third antinomy is as follows: "There are in the world causes through freedom". The anthithesis: "There is no freedom, but all is nature". This is the same question that Hume took up when he considered liberty and necessity, except that Hume solved the problem by defining free will in a way that is compatible with determinism. Kant doesn't take that approach. Kant approaches the problem by asserting that one can actually be the first cause of a causal series, even if natural causal necessity exists. He does this by saying that the natural necessity of causality is part of the world of appearances, that is, the world of space, time, change, and natural law. While the phenomenal world requires there to be a cause for each event, the noumenal world can have what Kant calls 'spontaneity'. Spontaneous causes are uncaused causes. How is this possible? It is possible only through a will that acts according to rationality. Because the prescriptions of rationality are independent from time and change, acting according to rationality is acting according to something independent of the phenomenal world. The phenomenal world would still retain the appearance of a prior cause, while in the world of things in themselves an action can be spontaneous.

Kant: Pure mathematics

According to Kant's distinctions, one would think that a single proposition should fall into one of four categories: (1) a posteriori/synthetic, (2) a posteriori/analytic, (3) a priori/analytic, and (4) a priori/synthetic.

The first category contains propositions which we come to know through experience and provide us with new information (the predicate is not contained in the subject). They are usually uncontroversial, but can be subject to interpretation. This is a big category--it contains statements such as "all bachelors drink beer" and "the president is dishonest." Here, the predicates are not contained in the subjects, and you would not be able to determine them without experience. The second category is mostly empty because it implies that we come to know a proposition whose predicate is contained in its subject through experience. There would be no reason for one to appeal to the senses for an explanation of something that is self explanatory. The third category includes logical truths that are necessarily true. So, for example, A=A. The predicate is contained in the subject, and the proposition can easily be known before any sort of sensory experience. The fourth category is the complicated one. It suggests that we may come to know a proposition that provides us with new information through reasoning alone. Kant asserts that geometry and arithmetic fall under this category.

Kant: analytic vs synthetic

Kant's next distinction is between analytic and synthetic judgments. This distinction is determined by the information contained as their content. In analytic judgments, the predicate is wholly contained in the subject. Analytic judgments do not really provide us with any new information. Kant's example of an analytic judgment is "all bodies are extended." It is contained in the definition of a body that it is extended in space, so we really do not receive any new information from that statement. Analytic judgments, like a priori information, are universal tautologies. Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, do provide new information. The predicate in one of these judgments is not contained in the subject. Kant's example is "all bodies are heavy." The predicate of "heavy" is not implied by the subject of "bodies." So, if someone just started talking about bodies, you would not immediately associate the word "heavy" with those bodies. Any connection between the predicate and the subject in a synthetic judgment is distinctly external to both. Therefore, even though synthetic judgments turn out to be informative, they do require justification. For simple purposes, I think that Kant's distinction will come in handy, but I think that the classification of one proposition may vary from person to person.

Kant: a priori vs a posteriori

Kant devotes a lot of time to drawing distinctions between different kinds of judgments that we make. The first distinction that he makes is rather simple, and that is the distinction between a priori and a posteriori judgment. The distinction comes from the origin of the information that we obtain. A priori (literally "from what comes before") information is determined by reason alone and can be found out without any particular experience. This makes a priori information universal tautologies. A posteriori (literally "from what comes later") information, on the other hand, requires a certain experience in order to obtain that knowledge. The information obtained, therefore, is limited and subject to interpretation. Kant, who blends rationalist and empiricist theories, says "that all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt... But... it by no means follows that all arises out of experience." I agree with Kant on this point, because we are not born with knowledge about mathematics, colors, or really anything else. But, with simple lessons here and there through experience, we can learn how to rationalize and reason through problems we have never encountered. So, for example, I can figure out what 29381818291301 plus 3181029138104 equals, even though I have never experienced that problem before. However, I need the prerequisites of knowing how to count and add in order to reason myself through the problem.

Hume: Missing shade of blue

Hume, as an empiricist, believes that any idea in the mind is really just an impression of something that was experienced through the senses. His example of the missing shade of blue, then, bothers me because it exactly disproves that idea.. and he agrees that it is a counterexample to his theory, but he doesn't seem to care. Assume that a man has seen every shade of every color in the world, except for one particular shade of blue. Pretend that this man is shown a series of cards, each of which has a shade of blue that he has previously experienced, and the cards are presented in order from lightest to darkest, with the exception of a blank card representing the shade of blue he has never seen. Would the man be able to imagine what that shade of blue would look like? Hume says yes, and I would agree with him. The man could infer that the missing shade is just a bit lighter than the card to its right, and just a bit darker than the card to its left. What bugs me about this is that Hume admits that the man would be able to figure that out, but that's in direct opposition to his basic arguments as an empiricist. The excuse Hume gives is that the example is "so singular that it is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim." I don't see why that is justified, because the missing shade of blue seems like a perfectly legitimate objection to his arguments. Hume kind of just dismisses it instead of tackling the problem.

Hume: Moral Responsibility

Part of Hume's version of compatiblism involves moral responsibility. Hume says that his compatibilism works with holding people morally responsible for their actions. He says human behavior falls in line with the natural chain of cause and effect. If this were not the case, then human behavior would be subject to randomness. Praise and blame are only justified, according to Hume, if actions are performed as a result of a person's character. I agree with Hume on this point, because if everything was random then we wouldn't be able to hold people responsible for their actions. If John murders his family, we cannot punish him because it was purely an act of randomness (this kind of reminds me of when people plead insanity and things like that--they couldn't help what they were doing or didn't understand the consequences of their actions). From here on out, however, I'm a little confused about Hume's argument. He goes on to say that we can justify praise and blame with determinism, and that in turn justifies freewill. That all seems a little out of order to me. First of all, Hume's earlier description of what justifies praise and blame sounded to me like freewill---if people can freely make the decision to murder their families, they should be blamed for it. If it was determined that an individual was going to murder his family, should he still be held responsible? Because if the act was determined, then he could not have done anything to stop it. So I don't think that determinism entails holding people morally responsible. I might agree that if determinism DID entail holding people morally responsible, then we could figure that we do have freewill. But Hume didn't argue for anything like that, so yet again, I disagree with him.

Hume: Compatibilism Pt 2

The only explanation that Hume gives for compatibilism is that both free will and determinism appear to be true. He defends determinism by saying that the chain of cause and effect in nature is inevitable, and everybody acknowledges that it is there--it is part of human psychology. He defends freewill by saying that we appear to freely do things that we are capable of doing. So, as long as you're not in chains or restricted by drugs or anything else, you have freewill. My problem with that, as I've stated in earlier posts, is that you can't really know that you're making those choices and doing those things freely. We can't prove that those things aren't part of the whole grand scheme of determinism. If we could go back in time, maybe we'd have a shot at proving or disproving that, but obviously we can't. But anyway, Hume does not address how determinism and freewill might work together. He just argues for determinism, and then argues for freewill. Since he has reasonable arguments for both, he decides that both are true and they work together. So if I'm going to agree with his theory of compatibilism, I would only have to agree that both determinism and freewill are true, without acknowledging how they might work together and all that. Obviously since I'm not convinced by his argument for freewill, I'm not convinced by his version of compatibilism. It seems to me like he kind of took the easy way out of this one because he liked the idea of compatibilism but didn't have any good arguments for it.