Kant- The first and second antinomies

The first two antinomies, the first having to do with space and time, and the second having to do with the simple and composite, both have opposing propositions (the thesis and antithesis). Whereas in the 3rd and 4th antinomies Kant argues that both the thesis and the antithesis are both actually true (and only mistaken to be contradictory when one takes phenomena to be noumena), Kant argues that the thesis and antithesis of the 1st and 2nd are both false. One might wonder how to contradicting propositions can both be untrue. It seems to be like the law of non contradiction in logic: P v ~P (P or not P), i.e., either something is the case or it is not. Kant explains that it is possible for two ocntradicting statements to both be false when "the concept lying at the ground of both of them is self-contradictory". Kant gives the example of a square circle. Two contradictory statements about square circles can both be false because the concept of a square circle is inherently contradictory. Because of that, any proposition which asserts anything about square circles is false. In the same way, when it comes to the question of whether or not space and time are infinite, or whether the constituents of the world are simply or composite, making any assertion of either the thesis or antithesis of either antinomy is assuming that experience is fit to give an answer. Becausethe world given to us IS equivalent to our experience, to suppose that our experience has the property of being simple or composite or infinite or finite is a mistaken notion.

Kant- The fourth antinomy

The fourth antinomy has to do with the existence of a first cause. Thesis: "In the series of world causes there is some necessary being". Antithesis: "There is nothing necessary in the world, but in this series all is contingent." Kant recognizes the objections raised by Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, where it is pointed out that we can not attribute qualities to the Supreme Being (such as understanding or will) because we can only do so by attributing anthropomorphic qualities to a being whom we cannot assume has them. Since we have our idea of will or of understanding only by reference to ourselves, we are not justified in assuming that God is like man. Kant says that we can refrain from doing this by using analogies. For example, although we cannot assume God to have rationality in the same way that we do, we can say that there is a rational structure to the world, and that

"reason is attributed to the supreme Being so far as it contains the ground of this rational form in the world, but according to analogy only, i.e., so far as this expression shows merely the relation which the Supreme Cause, unknown to us, has to the world in order to determine everything in it conformably to reason in the highest degree."

So although we may not be able to attribute properties directly to God (or a supreme being), we can attribute properties indirectly by way of analogy- by attributing properties to the relation which God bears to the world.

Kant- The third antinomy of pure reason

As for the second two antinomies, Kant says that the dialectically opposed propositions of each contradict one another only if one takes appearances (phenomena) to be things in themselves(noumena). The thesis of the third antinomy is as follows: "There are in the world causes through freedom". The anthithesis: "There is no freedom, but all is nature". This is the same question that Hume took up when he considered liberty and necessity, except that Hume solved the problem by defining free will in a way that is compatible with determinism. Kant doesn't take that approach. Kant approaches the problem by asserting that one can actually be the first cause of a causal series, even if natural causal necessity exists. He does this by saying that the natural necessity of causality is part of the world of appearances, that is, the world of space, time, change, and natural law. While the phenomenal world requires there to be a cause for each event, the noumenal world can have what Kant calls 'spontaneity'. Spontaneous causes are uncaused causes. How is this possible? It is possible only through a will that acts according to rationality. Because the prescriptions of rationality are independent from time and change, acting according to rationality is acting according to something independent of the phenomenal world. The phenomenal world would still retain the appearance of a prior cause, while in the world of things in themselves an action can be spontaneous.

Kant- The Pure Intuitions of Space and Time Pt. II

Given the considerations in my last post, we can begin to understand why Kant believes that we can have a priori synthetic knowledge (that is, a priori knowledge that adds to our knowledge, ie. certainty of the necessary connections of cause and effect, etc.). Kant says that "Geometry is based upon the pure intuition of space. Arithmetic attains its concepts of numbers by the successive addition of units in time". (Prolegomena Part I) Kant says further that "Sensibility, the form of which is the basis of geometry, is that upon which the possibility of external appearance depends." There are grand implications which follow from this statement in Kant's metaphysics. The implications are basically that our experience of space must conform to the same rules of sensibility that geometry conforms to.

Lets take an example: Kant says that the reason that there are only three spatial dimensions is geometrically based. Kant says that this is because not more than three lines can intersect to form right angles at any one point. This can be illustrated( or maybe intuited) by using the Cartesian coordinate system. Imagine an x and y axis, one for length and one for width. They intersect to form right angles. Now you can probably imagine a third axis, the z axis, which would represent depth. This line also forms right angles with the first two (you can visualize this by drawing a cube). Now if you try to figure out how to add another line which forms right angles through the same point, you will see that you cannot. It is a geometrical rule that no more than three lines can intersect to form right angles at any one point, and it is this rule to which our experience conforms. In fact, the possibility of our experience rests on its conformity to the pure intuitions of sensibility.

Kant- The Pure Intuitions of Space and Time

Kant believes that our experience is first and foremost experience of appearances (those which he calls 'phenomena') rather than things in themselves (or 'noumena'). Kant explains that all of our experience requires space and time. This seems fairly intuitive. Kant goes further. He says that space and time is not a property of things in themselves but rather the pure forms of intuition that make possible the world of appearances. This is another way of saying that space and time are not given to us by experience but rather that they are a priori categories of pure understanding which exist in the mind. Being a priori, they are prior to any sense experience. Now, a hardcore empiricist might here object with the slogan "nothing is in the intellect which is not first in the senses." But Kant might have the empiricists beat here. If we require space and time in order to experience anything at all, then space and time must be prior to the experience of any objects which exist in it. This is not to say that space and time exist temporally before any objects do (this would seem strange because there would have to be space and time without objects, which is arguably absurd), but rather that space and time are ontologically ('ontological' here means 'concerning existence or Being') prior to the appearance of objects in that space and time are necessary conditions for the having of experience.

Kant and The analytic synthetic distinction

There are two types of propositions, those that are analytic and those that are synthetic. An analytic proposition is constructed by analyzing a concept, while a synthetic proposition is constructed by synthesizing (or putting together) concepts. Analytic propositions do not add any new knowledge, that is, the predicate is contained conceptually in the subject. Synthetic propositions amplify knowledge, that is, the predicate contains something not thought of in the subject. Kant takes this distinction a step further. While it seems obvious that a posteriori knowledge (knowledge from sense experience) is synthetic, and that a priori knowledge (knowledge independent of experience) is analytic, Kant introduces the a priori synthetic. Here are some examples of the three types of propositions:

a priori analytic: "Triangles have three sides"
- Here the predicate " have three sides" is part of the definition of what a triangle is: a three angled, three sided, closed planar figure.

a priori synthetic: "The sum of the interior angles of a triangle is equal to 180 degrees"
- this fact concerning triangles can be proven apart from sense experience. We can derive this fact simply by what we know about a triangle by its definition.

a posteriori synthetic: "The sides of the pyramids at Giza are triangular"
- This is a contingent (as opposed to necessary, as all true a priori propositions are) fact about the world, and it requires sense experience in order to be discovered.

Hume on Moral Responsibility

I spoke in earlier posts about Hume's compatibilism when it comes to the question of free will. Hume believes that it is possible for necessity and liberty to coexist, mainly, as I argued, because one is free to act according to one's own desires. I said that even if these desires are determined by previous states of the world as well as the laws according to which it works, liberty is not infringed upon. Here is another question: If even one's desires are determined (according to which one makes decisions and acts), can they be held morally responsible for their actions?

First of all, this enough is clear: man is not responsible for his existence. Man is a contingent being, that is, man is dependent upon external factors for his existence. I said in earlier posts that even if a person could not have acted otherwise, he may still be free, namely because he acted necessarily according to the components that make him who he is. But can we be resentful (or grateful) to someone even if they could not have done otherwise? This question is in contemporary philosophy referred to as the question of reactive attitudes. Hume has this to say:

"A man who is robbed of a considerable sum; does he find his vexation for the loss any wise diminished by these sublime reflections? Why then should his moral resentment against the crime be supposed incompatible with them? Or why should not the acknowledgment of a real distinction between vice and virtue be reconcilable to all speculative systems of philosophy, as well as that of a real distinction between personal beauty and deformity?"

So Hume has made a point. Just because the world may have not been able to be other than what it is doesn't mean we can't distinguish between what is desirable and undesirable in it. But Hume only half answers the question of reactive attitudes. The tough question is not whether or not we can justifiably resent the actions, but whether or not we can justifiably resent the person who acted in such and such a way. I agree that determinism should not give us reason to give up moral distinctions, but I am quite unsatisfied with Hume's answer in that he does not address the real difficulty. Should we punish an individual for an undesirable action or simply recognize that it was undesirable (and possible try to rehabilitate the person instead of punishing him or her)?

Hume- the harmony of liberty and necessity pt. II

My last post laid out a definition of liberty that was compatible with the necessity of causality. I said that since nothing prohibits us from acting according to our determinations, we are free. Here is a possible objection: "Okay, it may be that you have the freedom to act according to certain desires that you have, but those desires themselves are determined in such a way that you cannot act any other way than how you do. In short, for any action you make, you could not have done otherwise." Here is my response (and probably also Hume's): I grant that I can not act in any other way that I do. That would be absurd. My actions may be determined by my desires, and my desires may also be themselves determined by an endless causal chain preceding them, but my freedom of will is actually secured by determinism, not endangered by it. Let me explain. In order for me to be a self-determining being, that is, a being who determines my own actions, it must be the case that I can effectively translate my own desires into action. My actions follow from certain desires, dispositions, inclinations, and deliberations that I have. These are all part of who I am. It is the necessity of causality that makes it possible for me to act on these desires, deliberations, dispositions, and inclinations that I have, rather than on any other factors. Some think that I need to be the first cause of my actions in order to be free, but if this were the case, and my actions were not determined by anything, then it would not be possible to have any actions. It is universally accepted that everything owes its existence to a prior cause, so if there were no prior cause to my actions, then I could not have any actions at all. Either that, or my actions would be a product of chance. Chance, though, doesn't really exist. It is not a physical object, it has no measure of mass or energy, and has no power in producing any effect. The word chance is a word used to describe one's ignorance (that is, we say that something is left to chance when we do not understand or cannot calculate all of the factors involved in a causal relation). Even if there was such a thing as chance, and my actions were not preceded by anything that determined what they would be, it hardly seems that chance would grant me the kind of freedom that I am looking for, because in order for my actions to be free, they need to arise from my desires and other factors that I identify with.

To sum this all up, I am free enough because I have the freedom to act according to my own desires. There seems no rational reason for wanting any more freedom than this, nor does it seem possible that there could conceivably be any freedom greater than this.

Hume- The harmony of liberty and necessity

Hume says that it is universally accepted that there are such things as necessary connections between causes and effects, even if it is only via the experience of the constant conjunction of events that furnishes us with this understanding. Many are concerned, though, that this causal necessity gives rise to a determinism which inhibits our freedom of will. If every event is necessitated by a prior event, then how can our actions be free? If it is the case that there are necessary connections between events (which we call causes and effects), then we know that our actions can be traced back on a causal chain of events that well predates our own existence. Understanding, and even arguing for this, Hume says that we are nonetheless free. How? Hume is a compatibilist of sorts, which means that he thinks that determinism is compatible with free will (and moral responsibility for that matter). Hume says that it boils down to this: "By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we chose to move, we also may." Since nothing is prohibiting us from acting according to our own determinations, we can be said to be free.

Hume on Causality Part III: Implications for Science

Given the considerations in my last two posts, we can ask questions of major consequence. The first is: what, then, given a new understanding of how we make inferences concerning causality, are the implications for science? What kind of certainty can we really furnish? Can we really say that we know that one event will follow another simply because it always has in the past? An this brings us back to one of Hume's initial questions: What reason (if we say that we indeed do know that one event will follow another because of past experiences) do we have for believing that the future will be like the past? It does not seem like we have any real reasons other than our deeply-implanted beliefs which are a result of custom and habit.

Here is the big question for science: What is a law?
A law is supposed to be a rule that dictates how nature behaves. A law is supposed to give us certainty in knowing how one body willact in a given situation. But given Hume's considerations, it seems like a law is more like a description of our past experience. Saying that something is a law of nature might be similar to saying "Well, physical bodies have behaved in such and such manner in the past without fail, so much so that we conclude that they will always behave in this way". Here is the killer for realists about scientific laws: Are the words "law" and "causality" really just useful fictions for describing our experience of the world? Maybe these words do not refer to anything that really exists out there in the physical world- maybe they are just useful terms to help us express what we are trying to say when it comes to explaining scientific theories.

Hume on Causality Pt. II: The Problem of Induction

Given the considerations in my last post, it seems evident that there must be something wrong with how we make inferences concerning cause and effect. If what we call 'cause' is really just "an object, followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second"(Hume, VII pt. II), then it seems that our idea of causality is not one produced by knowledge, but actually by habit or custom. What we really mean, then, when we say that something causes something else, is that in the past, it has always been the case that one event follows another. We do not actually have knowledge of what it is in the one event/object that "causes" the other event or object to happen. That is, we are ignorant of the force or power which compels one event to follow another. Our reasoning, if any, proceeds in this manner of induction:

Premise 1. At time q event A was accompanied by event B.
Premise 2. At time r event A was accompanied by event B.
Premise 3. At time s event A was accompanied by event B
Premise 4. At time t event A was accompanied by event B.

CONCLUSION: Event A causes event B.

Hume points out that we would never infer the conclusion after only one instance of the above happening. If we only observed it once, we would say only that events A and B were conjoined in our experience. But because we experience a constant conjunction of event A and B, we infer that there is some type of connection between them, which we call causality. We do not see this connection, nor do we know what it is.

Hume on Causality

Hume is concerned with the inferences we make concerning what we call "cause" and "effect". He asks what the basis is for one to see one event follow another and then to conclude that the first event caused the second. First of all, this inference is not made on the basis of a priori reasoning, that is, reasoning which precedes experience. Rather, the inference is based on what we experience. What reason do we have, Hume asks, for concluding that since one event was followed by another in the past, that this conjuction will hold for the future. Take bread, for example. Hume asks what justification we have for believing that since bread has nourished us in the past, that objects similar to the bread we have eaten in the past will also nourish us. In other words, what reason do we have for believing that the future will be like the past? But we almost never conclude that there is a causal relation between two events until we have experienced them cnjoined in many instances. For example, fire has never in the past failed to be accompanied by heat, nor snow by cold, so we naturally make the inference that fire causes heat and snow causes coldness. Since we have not discovered WHY the one event follows the other, but that we continue to make the inference that the two events are causally related anyway, Hume concludes that it is not because of any reasoning that we make the inference, but because of habit/custom.

Is it possible to be both determined and free?

It is a common debate in philosophy over whether or not man is a free agent, that is, if he acts freely. Determinism is the proposition that everything is determined by prior states of the world and the laws of nature. If man is part of the physical world, including his brain (which would include his thoughts, desires, deliberations, emotions, etc.), then it seems that he is determined to be what he is and to do what he does. If man is determined, is it possible that he may still be able to have free will? At first glance one might think that the two, determinism and free will, are incompatible, that is, that it's either one way or the other. But this may not be the case, it may not be as simple as that. It depends how you define free will.

One formulation is that free will is the the power to do otherwise. Here's an example. I went to class today. If I really had free will, according to this definition, then I must have had the power to have not gone to class. But if I am determined to do what I do, then I could not have done anything other than what I did do, and then I cannot have free will according to this definition.
Try out this definition: Free will is the power to be able to do what you want to do. This definition is much less problematic. Take the example of me going to class today. I went to class because I want to get a good grade. No one prohibited me from going, I went because I wanted to go. It may be that I am determined to have the desires that I have (such as the desire to want to get good grades in school and the desire to go to class), but nevertheless I was free to do what I wanted to do. With this definition of free will, I can be both determined and free at the same time.

Locke gives a lot of his own thoughts on freedom and the will in Locke Bk. II, Chap. XXI.

Locke Bk II Ch. 9 pt .8- Molineux's Problem

Locke had a lawyer friend named Molineux who posed a very interesting and very relevant question for empiricism. Molineux says that suppose a man grew up blind from birth, and was taught to identify and to tell the difference between certain physical objects and shapes, such as a cube and a sphere, via touch. The man learns to identify figures like these by sliding his hands around the figure and feeling the shape of it. Here is the question: If someone placed a cube and a sphere on a table in front of this man, and if he was instantly endowed with the ability to see, would he be able to identify each object as a cube or a sphere? Molineux answers "no", because the man has yet to experience that what affects his touch in a certain way can affect his eyes correspondingly. This is something that no one could teach him while he was blind, he would have to learn it from experience. Locke agrees wholeheartedly with Molineux.

Locke Book II Ch. 8, 1-6:Positive & Privative Causes

In the beginning of chapter eight, Locke discusses an interesting approach to the concept of privation. Although a cause may be privative, the idea which it causes may nonetheless be positive. Take the example that Locke gives of the colors black and white. Although we know that our experience of blackness is caused by a privation (i.e., the lack of light), the idea of blackness is something positive. When we speak of darkness or blackness, we do not need to be thinking of it as the absence of light or white. This holds true for painters, for whom black is a positive color, even though the color black itself may simply be a privation of the color white. This seems problematic, though, and Locke would agree, because its not clear that black is caused by the lack of white as much as darkness is caused by the lack of light. another example would be a hole. A hole is caused by a lack of material substance in something physical. For example, a hole in a plastic bucket is a hole by virtue of it being a location without plastic. nevertheless, we can meaningfully speak of the shape of the hole in the bucket without having to first speak of the shape of the bucket around the hole. We could relate this same type of reasoning to shadows. A Shadow is caused by light being blocked by something, and the shadow takes the shape of that something which is blocking the light. So although the shadow is really just an absence of light, the shape of the shadow s a shape of something positive, namely the shape of whatever is causing the shadow.

Locke Book I Conclusion: No Innate Principles

After examining the various types of innate principles that men claim to have (speculative, practical, and the innate idea of God), Locke concludes that there simply are no innate principles. The test of universal consent has failed miserably in each case. If one argues that all rational men have these innate ideas, then that hardly suffices for universal consent. Locke challenges any proponent of innate ideas to list which ideas are innate and which aren't. Even among supporters of innate ideas there is disagreement over which ideas are innate and which aren't. Locke says that if there really were such a thing as innate ideas, they should be clear and distinct enough to tell them apart from ideas which are not innate. Lastly, he says that you won't be able to find any young child who is able to consent to any of these ideas (speculative principles of logic, practical principles of morality, or the idea of God) who hasn't been taught them yet. These ideas only seem innate for two main reasons: 1.) People are taught them at an early age and these basic ideas become foundational to everything else that people learn in their lives, so much so that they seem innate, and 2.) The ideas seem so self-evident that it seems that they could not be anything but innate. Locke says that the ideas only seem innate to those who have either been educated in them or have learned them from their own experience.

Locke Book I- No innate idea of God

In arguing against the innateness of an idea of God, Locke is not trying to disprove the existence of God. He is rather arguing that any knowledge or concept of God is derived from people who, using their reason correctly, "thought out the causes of things, and traced them to their original" (p.90) He says that the idea of God is clearly not innate for a few reasons. First, there are entire cultures of people around the world that do not have any clear concept of God. Second, there are cultures which are polytheistic and worship many Gods, and Locke says "What true and tolerable notion of a Diety, could they have, who acknowledged, and worshiped hundreds?"(p.93) The third reason given is that among peoples who do have a notion of God, the difference in these notion across various cultures (and within the same culture) is so great that they are clearly not the same notions of God. There are even those who have a notion of God but deliberately reject it- atheists. Locke believes that the idea of God is one that any rational person who gives time and thought to understanding the world would come to. For Locke, God chose to give us the faculties of understanding rather than an innate idea. To those who believe that since God is good he must have imprinted on the hearts of man an idea of himself, Locke says: "it seems to me a little to much confidence of our own wisdom, to say, I think it best, and therefore God hath made it so." (p.91)

Locke Book I- No Innate practical principles

Locke argues that there are also no innate practical principles (that is, princples concerning how men ought to act, either imperatively in a hypothetical sense or in a cetegorical sense, as Kant will later point out). If there were principles imprinted on the mind or soul of all men, then surely there would be much less confusion and dissent as to what is right and wrong. First, he points out that many different societies have drastically different idea of morality, where in one society (such as ours) infanticide would seem to be a clear case of immorality, other cultures hold that it is acceptable by moral standards. Because such differing extremes of moral stadards exist, it seems unlikely that there is one true moral law that men have imprinted on their minds or souls. A second argument that he uses is that if men had a clear and distinct moral law imprinted on their minds, then they would also have the conception of a moral lawgiver, namely a God, who had the power to punish those who broke the laws. Since plenty of individual men as well as whole societies act in morally contradictory ways, men must not have a clear and distinct idea of a lawgiver because they clearly don't fear him enough to act "morally". Locke holds that there is nonetheless a morality, but instead of it being innate it is discovered through reason. He argues that God has given us the faculty of reason so that we would use it rather than a ready-made set of true propositions. "God having endued man with those faculties of knowing which he hath, was no more abliged by his goodness, to implant those innate notions in his mind, than that having given him reason, hands, and materials, he should build him bridges, or houses. . ."

Locke Book I- No innate speculative principles

Locke is writing as one of the most proiminent and foundational empiricists in modern philosophy. The main doctine of empiricism is that there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the sense (see Sextus Empiricus). So one of the first things Locke must do to present his argument is to demonstrate that there is no such thing as innate ideas, the doctrine of innate ideas being one which many rationalists and idealists in philosophy hold dear. Descartes was one of the major proponents of innateness in Locke's time, defending the case of the idea of God being innate and a "clear and distinct" idea. Locke is out to prove him wrong. He begins by taking what most proponents of innateness take to be one of the most fundamental innate ideas, namely that it is impossible for a thing to be and to not be (see the logical law of non contradiction). The proponents of innateness use the argument that something can be proved innate if it is universally consented to, that is, if it is something which everyone can agree on. Locke destroys the idea of universal consent in that it cannot be found for any idea, no matter how seemingly foundational, and that even if it were the case that something was universally consented to, it would not prove something innate. The problem for innateness is that in order for someone to consent to the validity of a proposition such as the above one (that it is impossible for a hting to be and not be), they would have to understand the concepts that make up that proposition. An example will hardly be found among young children in which one would actually be able to understand what is being proposed by that proposition. They might first need to understand the idea of substance (that is, a permanence of some sort), and then in turn to understand the concept of permanence through time, and then in turn understand what a logical contradiction is. Locke argues that this, along with the fact that many grown men will hardly understand the proposition, proves innateness of speculative principles false. This does not necessarily mean the the proposition is false, but rather that an assent or denial can only come once someone has been educated.

Meditation 5- The ontological argument

". . .when I concentrate more carefully, it is quite evident that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than the fact that its three angles equal two right angles can be separated from the essence of a triangle, or than the idea of a mountain can be separated from the idea of a valley."
Descartes reasons that he cannot think of God as not existing, so he must exist. Now this seems pretty foolish. Here is his reason: it is the essence of God to exist, just as it is impossible to imagine a triangle without it having three angles equaling 180 degrees, and impossible to think of a mountain which doesn't have a corresponding valley. Here essence can be separated from existence: just because we cannot separate the idea of a mountain from a valley doesn't mean that either one necessarily exists- it just means that IF a mountain exists then it must have a corresponding valley. For Descartes though, it is part of the essence of God to exist, so that God is the only being in which existence is included in or implied by his essence. Descartes says that this is because God is perfect, and existence is a perfection, just as omniscience and omnipotence are. So this sounds a little bit better than it did in the beginning.

So here is Descartes' version of he ontological argument:

1. God is perfect
2. It is part of the essence of something perfect to exist
C: God exists

I'm sure that this argument seems wrong in some way, whether or not you can put your finger on what seems wrong about it. Here is what is wrong: existence is not a predicate (or a property attributable to something). Of course anything which has a property exists, but existence itself is not a property, it is a quantifier ( as Immanuel Kant will later point out).